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Justice Ginsburg’s Fiduciary Loophole: A Viable
Achilles’ Heel to HMOs’ Impenetrable ERISA Shield
I. INTRODUCTION
Although at first Juan Davila only felt weak, he was later rushed
to the emergency room to find severe internal bleeding that nearly
took his life. With seven units of blood, five days in critical care, and
a subsequent hospital stay, he barely cheated death, but not unscathed.1 Previously, his health maintenance organization (HMO),
Aetna, had refused to cover Vioxx—the medication recommended
by his physician to treat his rheumatoid arthritis—and instead only
consented to cover Naproxen, a less expensive pain killer.2 With neither the time nor the means to appeal Aetna’s decision, Davila opted
to accept the covered treatment.3 As a result of his HMO’s coverage
decision of what it considered a “medical necessity,” Davila barely
escaped impending death and was left in a state in which he could no
longer take any oral medication, including Vioxx.4
Sadly enough, Juan Davila is just one tragic example of many
Americans who have suffered from poor HMO decisions or delays.5
What is almost equally tragic is that legally the courts’ hands are tied
from providing compensatory relief to patients injured from HMOs’
decisions, such as denying coverage of doctor-prescribed treatments.
Under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), courts cannot provide compensatory relief for victims like
Juan Davila—or so courts have interpreted ERISA historically.6
In reality, the U.S. Supreme Court has inadvertently painted itself into a corner by restrictively interpreting ERISA to preclude
1. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Brief for Respondents at 7, Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83).
5. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 83 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated, Vytra Healthcare v.
Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (delaying a plaintiff’s cancer treatment resulting in the plaintiff’s
demise due to disagreement between the plaintiff’s treating physician and his HMO as to
whether a blood stem cell transplant was too experimental); Roark, 307 F.3d at 303–04 (refusing to cover treatments of the plaintiff’s spider bite wound resulted in double amputations).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
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compensatory relief to victims of HMO patient treatment decisions,
which is duly incompatible with issues like HMO liability for employer-based HMO plans. Congress intended ERISA to provide national uniformity in administration of employee benefit plans.7 To
this end, ERISA expressly provides that any claims related to an employer plan under state laws are preempted by ERISA.8 But at the
time of ERISA’s creation, employer-based HMOs were not prevalent
in the health care system. And because ERISA was created before the
rise of HMOs, Congress could not anticipate the extent to which
ERISA would affect HMO liability. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory language of ERISA to indicate that Congress intended to only provide traditional equitable relief, such as injunction
or restitution, for claims brought against ERISA plans.9 What this
means, in part, is that persons injured due to delay or denial of benefit coverage cannot receive compensatory relief from their HMO. In
effect, the law initially enacted to protect plan participants is thus
turned against them in the HMO context.
Consequently, injured participants are left with few options.
With no compensatory damages available under ERISA, a natural reaction for plaintiffs would be to make claims under different state
laws. However, ERISA also preempts any claim related to ERISA
plans.10 Hence, plaintiffs still receive no compensation. Crafty lawyers
have attempted—with limited success—to circumvent the ERISA
barrier in other ways. For instance, ERISA itself contains a safe harbor called the Savings Clause, which allows state law claims to avoid
ERISA preemption if the claims relate to the “business of insurance.”11 However, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the
Savings Clause to only allow exemption from preemption if the state
law claimed does not replace, or in other words, conflict with what is
covered by ERISA’s remedial scheme as contained in § 502.12 In a
few situations, other state claims against HMOs have circumvented

7. See id. § 1001(a).
8. Id. § 1144(a).
9. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58, 262–63 (1993).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
11. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see, e.g., Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S.
329, 336 (2003).
12. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375–76 (2002) (stating
that there are few civil enforcement exemptions from ERISA’s federal preemption).
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ERISA preemption, such as corporate negligence,13 bad faith,14 vicarious liability,15 and even federal RICO claims.16
Recently, however, in a concurring opinion of the Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila decision, Justice Ginsburg referred to an argument in
the Government’s amicus brief mentioning a specific uncharted area
of the law that may potentially provide monetary relief to ERISA
plan members.17 She pointed out that the Supreme Court had not
yet precluded make-whole relief under a breach of fiduciary duty
claim.18
In related cases, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, based his
decision solely on specific statutory language, interpreting ERISA’s
remedial scheme to protect only ERISA plans and to preclude individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty.19 Naturally, with such an extreme action from the textualist side of the Court, one can expect an
(nearly) equal and opposite reaction from the purposivist side of the
Court. And so it came; Justice Stevens’s dissent countered the majority with a more employee-friendly alternative approach based on
common law trust principles that would award individual compensatory relief under ERISA for breaches of fiduciary duty.20 Indeed, it is
difficult to predict which side will prevail when the issue of ERISA
damages based on a claim of HMO breach of fiduciary duty finally is

13. See, e.g., CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Pybas, 127 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex.
App. 2004) (awarding damages to the respondent/plaintiff for corporate negligence).
14. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding ERISA preempts insureds’ bad faith claims).
15. See, e.g., Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 848–49
(Fla. 2003) (holding that a state law wrongful death claim, based on vicarious liability against
an HMO for medical malpractice of its physicians, is not preempted by ERISA because it does
not “relate to” ERISA plan administration).
16. See, e.g., In re Managed Care Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314–15 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (finding the plaintiff’s RICO claims reverse-preempted by particular state law that does
not allow civil damages). Emotional distress claims did not survive. See, e.g., Palmer v. Superior
Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 266–67 (Ct. App. 2002) (reasoning that an HMO’s decision to
use medical utilization review was not an administrative decision but a medical clinical judgment).
17. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27–28 & n.13,
Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83)).
18. See id.
19. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58, 262–63 (1993); see also GreatWest Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209–10 (2002).
20. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting); see also Great-West, 534 U.S. at
225–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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squarely before the Supreme Court. One may question if perhaps
this is the long-awaited claim for relief—the light at the end of the
tunnel—that will finally survive under ERISA. That depends on a
delicate balance between textualists and purposivists that exists
among the Supreme Court Justices.
This Comment discusses how Justice Ginsburg’s fiduciary
“loophole”—specifically, damages claimed for the breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA in the context of HMOs—may fare before the
Supreme Court in light of the delicate balance that exists among Supreme Court Justices. This Comment argues that Justice Ginsburg’s
loophole should be in fact a viable Achilles’ heel to HMOs’ impenetrable ERISA shield. The drafters of ERISA’s remedial scheme intended the courts to derive its interpretation from its more readily
apparent context and the purpose of the statute, as Justice Stevens
has suggested, rather than encrypting it in outmoded terminology, as
Justice Scalia has reasoned. Under this interpretation, Congress obviously intended to provide compensatory relief to those injured
ERISA plan members. As the issue now stands, Justice Ginsburg
emphasizes that there is a “rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”21 Furthermore, as HMO liability is really an issue more far reaching than ERISA is designed to cover, this
Comment argues that HMO liability truly deserves closer congressional attention.
Part II of this Comment provides a background of ERISA and its
troubling application in HMO liability. Part III describes the significant case history, in which Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens clashed
on the issue of what sort of remedies ERISA provides. Part IV contrasts the overarching viewpoints of Scalia and Stevens. Finally, particularly in light of the Court’s two opposing approaches toward
ERISA remedies, Part V implicates how Justice Ginsburg’s fiduciary
loophole should be the proper interpretation.

21. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 222 (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d
442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
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II. ERISA BACKGROUND

ERISA first made its way into the congressional limelight with
the closing of the Studebaker South Bend, Indiana factory in 1963.22
Studebaker defaulted on pension payments because its pension plan
was not adequately funded to compensate all of its vested pension
obligations.23 This event catalyzed long-awaited congressional action
in pension reform.24 Assistant Secretary Thomas R. Donahue depicted Studebaker’s tangled plight before Congress as follows:
In all too many cases the pension promise shrinks to this: “If you
remain in good health and stay with the same company until you
are 65 years old, and if the company is still in business, and if your
department has not been abolished, and if you haven’t been laid off
for too long a period, and if there is enough money in the fund,
and if that money has been prudently managed, you will get a pension.”25

As a result of the flaws in pension systems, United Auto Workers
(UAW) labor union proposed legislative reform.26 UAW officials, for
example, proposed legislation to protect employee benefits from default risk by creating a pension reinsurance.27 This marked the beginning of a series of employee benefit reforms that compose ERISA,
which was enacted in 1974.28
Congress wanted to create a comprehensive scheme to regulate
employee benefit plans—both pension plans and welfare plans.29
ERISA was intended to provide uniform regulation of employee
benefit plans30 and “to protect . . . the interests of [plan] participants
. . . by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready ac-

22. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 726 (2001).
23. Id. at 683–84.
24. Id. at 684.
25. Pension and Welfare Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on
Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 217 (1968) (statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Services, Department of Labor).
26. Wooten, supra note 22, at 684.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See generally DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003)
(explaining the need for ERISA).
30. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
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cess to the Federal courts.”31 In general, ERISA’s provisions ensure
(1) adequate funding of pension plans, (2) vesting of benefits for
plan participants, and (3) fiduciary obligations for plan administrators, arguably based in trust law, as will be explained later.32
Because ERISA is a lengthy statute, the following sections will
explore only those portions that seem most relevant to the issue of
individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty in the HMO context.
Section A will give a brief overview of HMOs and how they relate to
ERISA. Section B will explain the civil remedies provided for in
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Section C will describe how the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of § 502(a)(1)(B) has limited the availability
of ERISA civil remedies. Last, Section D will discuss how the
Court’s overly-narrow interpretation has created a “regulatory vacuum” of remedies for plaintiffs.
A. HMO Background in ERISA Context
Before delving further into an analysis of ERISA civil remedies
against HMOs for breach of fiduciary duty, it is helpful to first understand how HMOs fit into the ERISA context. In the thirty years
since ERISA was enacted, the health care industry has changed dramatically. Managed care systems, such as HMOs, did not exist as the
massive, industry-dominating giants we know today. At the time of
ERISA’s enactment, physicians billed insurers after treating patients
in a fee-for-service program, whereupon insurers made retrospective
coverage decisions.33 If insurers denied coverage for treatments, patients could seek benefits due under ERISA § 502(a).34 Today, however, managed care employee-benefit plans are more prevalent
among the American workforce, with three out of four workers having this type of plan.35 In contrast to the fee-for-service practice in
the past, HMOs now determine treatment coverage prospectively as

31. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
32. Pamela D. Perdue, Overview of ERISA’s Legislative and Regulatory Scheme, SJ068
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 5 (2004); see Davila, 542 U.S. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court needs to . . . realign ERISA remedy law with the trust remedial tradition that
Congress intended [when it provided in § 502(a)(3) for] ‘appropriate equitable relief.’” (quoting John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error
in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003))).
33. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000).
34. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 464.
35. Id.
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a cost-saving measure, based on a utilization review board’s determination of “medical necessity” before any treatment takes place.36
Unfortunately, under today’s HMO coverage system, a wrongful
delay or denial of coverage can cause injurious, even tragic, consequences. Quite often, the HMO’s coverage decision in a medical
emergency “de facto determines a patient’s actual treatment along
with his eligibility for benefits . . . .”37 Because of the time and inconvenience involved in appealing coverage denial, most patients in
urgent circumstances do not attempt to appeal the denial of coverage.38 Instead, they opt in haste to pay out of pocket, to forego the
treatment, or to use a less expensive treatment.39 As will be discussed
later, ERISA does not permit compensatory damages according to
the Supreme Court majority—a tragedy for a plan participant who is
injured from an HMO’s negligence.40
One of the primary purposes of ERISA is to enforce the fiduciary
duties of plan administrators.41 A fiduciary under ERISA is any person “[who] has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [an employee benefit] plan.”42 Therefore, HMOs are generally regarded as plan fiduciaries when they use
their discretion, as part of their plan administrative duties, to make
eligibility decisions for plan benefits,43 though that distinction is not
always clear.44 Once a court determines that an HMO is acting as a
fiduciary, it may then determine what relief is available under ERISA
for an HMO’s breach of fiduciary duty.
Most claims against HMOs were typically brought under state
law claims to avoid ERISA’s strict remedial scheme. Consequently,
Congress included a preemption provision that supersedes most state
laws relating to employee benefit plans to maintain uniformity in

36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 224
(2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Langbein, supra note 32, at 1319).
42. ERISA § 3(21)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (2000).
43. Id.; Davila, 542 U.S. at 219.
44. See infra Part III.A.
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regulation of employee benefit plans.45 Therefore, plan participants
are limited to seeking a remedy under § 502(a).
B. Section 502(a)(1)(B) Civil Enforcement Provisions
In terms of HMO liability for breach of fiduciary duty, the
remedies provided in the ERISA Civil Enforcement Provisions, as
contained in § 502, are the source of much of the debate. ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a plan participant or beneficiary may
bring civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”46 Additionally, § 502(a)(2) allows plan participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries to bring a civil action “for appropriate relief under [§ 409] of
this title.”47 Section 502(a)(3) allows them to bring civil action “(A)
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”48
The central debate concerning the scope of ERISA Civil Enforcement Provisions stems from the judicial interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3). The Supreme Court, under Justice Scalia, feared that the phrase could potentially cover all
types of relief, “render[ing] the modifier [‘equitable’] superfluous.”49
Therefore, in the landmark Mertens v. Hewitt Associates decision, the
Court limited the scope of “appropriate equitable relief” to “those
categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory dam-

45. Alden J. Bianchi, ERISA and Health Plans: Selected Court Decisions—Focus on
ERISA Preemption Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller, Davila v. Aetna, Hawaii
Management Alliance Association v. Insurance Commissioner, SK064 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1035,
1037, 1042 (2005); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1144(a).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
47. Id. § 1132(a)(2); see id. § 1109(a) (“Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a
plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries
by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary.”).
48. Id. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added).
49. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993).
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ages).”50 Prior to limiting the scope of civil remedies available within
ERISA in Mertens, the Court limited the availability of civil remedies
outside of ERISA in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.51
C. Section 502(a) Exclusive List of Remedies:
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that ERISA was intended to provide a “comprehensive civil enforcement scheme.”52 In other words, plaintiffs are limited to the
remedies expressly provided for in the “plain” language of ERISA itself.53 Indeed, according to the Court in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, plan participants would undermine the policy reasons
Congress adopted when it selected the provisions contained in
§ 502(a), such as uniformity in plan administration, if they “were
free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in
ERISA.”54 Thus, “any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts
with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive” and is preempted by the provisions in § 502(a).55 For better or
for worse, plaintiffs are stuck with ERISA’s exclusive remedial
scheme.
D. Regulatory Vacuum
In essence, Justice Scalia’s narrow scope of remedies combined
with ERISA’s preemption clause has left most injured ERISA plan
participants empty-handed, without remedy against their HMO, in
what has been termed a “regulatory vacuum.”56 ERISA’s broad pre-

50. Id. at 256, 262–63.
51. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004). ERISA’s “carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions . . . provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend
to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.” Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
481 U.S. at 54 (quoting Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47
(1985)).
56. Kelly M. Loud, Note, ERISA Preemption and Patients’ Rights in the Wake of Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1061 (2005) (quoting Davila, 542 U.S. at
222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
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emptive power strips the plaintiff of state remedies.57 Yet, ERISA’s
“comprehensive and reticulated” scheme fails to replace them with
appropriate federal remedies for a plaintiff physically injured due to
delay or denial of medical treatment coverage.58 The Court has made
it abundantly clear that there is no compensatory relief available under ERISA for consequential injury.59 If the most an HMO would
have to provide as an ERISA remedy would be an injunction or the
cost of the denied treatment, it stands to reason that an HMO would
seek ERISA preemption.60 In most cases, unless the plaintiff seeks a
preliminary injunction or reimbursement for denied treatment that
he or she has already paid for out-of-pocket, the plaintiff, being unable to recover for resulting injuries, is simply out of luck, while the
HMO incurs no liability for the injury.61 Under ERISA’s liability
shield, there seems to be little that can stop HMOs from inducing
unbridled harm to ERISA plan members.62
Thus, perhaps the Court, in its strict textualist approach for consistency, has lost sight of ERISA’s mission to protect the interests of
plan participants. Indeed, the Court indicated that the ERISA drafters “were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets,
and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than
with the rights of the individual beneficiary.”63
Furthermore, ERISA participants’ desperate attempts to circumvent ERISA’s remedial scheme have been met with little success in
the courts—those claims that do succeed tend to be the exception

57. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54.
58. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251, 254 (1993) (quoting Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
59. Id. at 256–58, 262–63.
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000); see also Allen D. Allred & Don L. Daniel, Upon
Further Review: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and a New Era of Managed Care Organization Liability, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 309, 314 (2003).
61. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 211.
62. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453–54 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“However, with the rise of managed care and the Supreme Court’s series of decisions holding
preempted any action for damages against HMOs, ERISA has evolved into a shield that insulates HMOs from liability for even the most egregious acts of dereliction committed against
plan beneficiaries, a state of affairs that I view as directly contrary to the intent of Congress.
Indeed, existing ERISA jurisprudence creates a monetary incentive for HMOs to mistreat
those beneficiaries, who are often in the throes of medical crises and entirely unable to assert
what meager rights they possess.”).
63. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985).
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rather than the rule.64 Instead of trying to get around ERISA preemption, Justice Ginsburg’s unique approach to this dilemma actually embraces ERISA’s remedial scheme. In her concurrence in the
recent Davila decision, she proposed the breach of fiduciary duty
claim as a potential source of relief available under
§ 502(a)(3), which provides for “other appropriate equitable relief.”65 Though the Court has not yet ruled on this exact issue in the
HMO context, Part III introduces a series of cases that illustrate the
tug-of-war within the Court for the “appropriate” scope of §
502(a)(3).
III. “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF” REVEALED
A. ERISA § 502(a)(3): Outside of the Realm of HMOs
1. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell
Beginning with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell in 1985, a sharp division arose in the Court as to the scope of
“equitable” relief available to individual ERISA plan beneficiaries.66
The plaintiff in Russell sought compensation for her disability plan’s
wrongful denial of benefits.67 The majority decision, authored by
Justice Stevens, ruled against individual relief under §§ 409(a) and
502(a)(2), which allowed relief only to the plan for breach of fiduciary duty.68 What is more, Justice Stevens read ERISA as so “comprehensive and reticulated” that the Court is precluded from inferring
other remedies not expressly included in the statute because Con-

64. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that ERISA preempts insureds’ bad faith claims); In re Managed Care Litig., 185 F.
Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Palmer v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252 (Ct. App.
2002); Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2003) (holding
that a state law wrongful death claim, based on vicarious liability against an HMO for medical
malpractice of its physicians, is not preempted by ERISA because it does not “relate to” ERISA
plan administration); CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Pybas, 127 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App.
2004).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000); Davila, 542 U.S. at 224.
66. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
67. Id. at 136–37.
68. Id. at 142–43, 145–48.
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gress had actually intended to omit them.69 Taking it one step further, Justice Scalia extended this theory to § 502(a)(3) relief in his
decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates70 and Great-West Life and
Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.71 As explained in more detail below, it was Justice Stevens’s opinion in Russell that seemed to later
spark Justice Scalia’s restrictive Mertens opinion.72
The Russell concurrence by Justice Brennan was quick to catch
Justice Stevens’s assumed misstatement: that ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute.”73 According to Brennan, ERISA’s
legislative history demonstrates that Congress rather intended
ERISA to provide a general skeletal scheme that was to be further
developed by case law.74
2. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
Gleaning from Justice Stevens’s dicta in Russell, Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Mertens took an awkwardly narrow approach to “equitable” relief. In Mertens, the plaintiff was unable to recover all of his
accrued benefits from either his insolvent employer or the ERISA
plan’s termination insurance program.75 The plaintiff sought compensatory damages against an actuarial firm for its involvement with
the employer’s plan accounts and for the firm’s failure to reveal that
the accounts were under-funded.76 The Court held that because
Congress intended ERISA to be an all-inclusive legal package, according to Russell, “equitable” relief in § 502(a)(3) against a nonfiduciary must not include the application of outside trust law.77 The
Court reasoned that “‘[e]quitable’ relief must mean something less
than all relief.”78 Instead, it must only refer to those remedies typi69. Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361
(1980)).
70. 508 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1993).
71. 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002).
72. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
73. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 155 (Brennan, J., concurring). This decision was joined by
Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall.
74. See id. at 152 n.6, 155–57 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also infra note 266 and
accompanying text. Justice Brennan’s appeal to legislative history will be highlighted in greater
detail in Part IV of this Comment.
75. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 251, 261–63.
78. Id. at 258 n.8.
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cally available in equity from the days of the divided bench.79 Those
remedies included injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but expressly excluded compensatory damages.80
In a surprising about-face of loyalty from the strict textualist
Scalia camp to the more purposivist side, Justice Stevens switched
from his majority opinion in Russell against individual compensatory
relief under § 502(a)(2) to the dissent approach in Mertens, favoring
individual compensatory relief under § 502(a)(3).81 He, along with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, joined Justice
White’s dissent.82 The dissent argued that monetary compensatory
damages to “make the victims [of the breach] whole” are an acceptable form of equitable relief traditionally awarded in trust common
law.83 Thus, according to the dissent, the majority under Justice
Scalia was mistaken in precluding all forms of compensatory damages.84
3. Varity Corp. v. Howe
Just when it seemed there was no hope for any kind of practicable relief for injured individual ERISA plan participants, hope finally
came in the Varity Corp. v. Howe decision of 1996, in which the Supreme Court purposivist camp finally prevailed and thereby provided individual compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary duties to
plan participants.85 In Varity, the plan fiduciaries purposefully misled
the employees under the plan.86 The Court distinguished Russell,
holding that even though individual relief for breach of fiduciary
duty is not available under §§ 409(a) and 502(a)(2), it is available
under § 502(a)(3).87 According to the majority, there was no reason
why Congress would have denied relief under those circumstances.88

79. Id. at 256–57.
80. Id. at 256.
81. Id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
134–35 (1985).
82. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 266–67.
84. Id. at 263–64.
85. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
86. Id. at 494.
87. Id. at 515.
88. Id. at 513.
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Naturally, the textualist camp contended this result.89 Justice
Thomas’s lengthy dissent reiterated a strict, confined statutory construction—arguing in true textualist style against any remedy not expressly included in the statute.90 It maintained that Russell should
also apply to § 502(a)(3), especially since ERISA was not intended
to follow the trust common law definition of fiduciary duty to protect plan participants, but to protect the integrity of the plan itself.91
In short, there should be no recovery for breach of fiduciary duty
under § 502(a)(3).92
4. Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
Lastly, in 2002, the pendulum swung back in favor of the textualist side in Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,93
in which Justice Scalia supported the majority’s earlier Mertens decision. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., the plaintiff in this
case, sought subrogation for insurance benefits it paid a plan beneficiary who later received compensatory relief from the third party
tortfeasor.94 Again, the majority under Justice Scalia reiterated the
same narrow interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” used in
Mertens95—those “typically available in equity”96—due to the comprehensive nature of ERISA’s construction.97 The Court ruled that a
plaintiff could not hold a defendant personally liable for restitution
in equity but could only recover the plaintiff’s particular identifiable
property in the defendant’s possession.98 However, the Court held
against recovery for the ERISA plan because the settlement funds
were not in the defendant’s possession.99
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority’s decision. He
pointed out that Mertens applied only to § 502(a)(3)(B) for “other

89. See id. at 516 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This dissent was joined by Justices
O’Connor and Scalia.
90. Id. at 516–22.
91. Id. at 522–25.
92. Id. at 516.
93. 534 U.S. 204, 209–10 (2002).
94. Id. at 208.
95. Id. at 209 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994)).
96. Id. at 210 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)).
97. Id. at 209–10.
98. Id. at 213–14.
99. Id. at 214.
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appropriate equitable relief”—not to the instant case seeking injunction under § 502(a)(3)(A).100 Essentially, he saw no reason why
Congress would create a cause of action and not provide a remedy
for plan participants.101 So, according to Justice Stevens, it would
stand to reason that the majority had no basis for insisting that Congress intended to preclude compensatory remedies to plan participants, other than its historical analysis of an obsolete court system.102
Justice Ginsburg also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. First, reflecting Justice Stevens’s
separate comments, Justice Ginsburg blasted the majority for relying
on an unjustifiable definition of “equitable” relief that not only had
been abandoned since the 1930s but also contradicted “Congress’
stated goals in enacting ERISA.”103 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent supported a flexible definition of equitable relief, based in trust law,
adaptable to provide the “appropriate . . . equitable relief in each
case.”104
Also, it is worth noting some critical flaws in Justice Scalia’s position in Great-West on § 502(a)(3) restitution, as pointed out by Professor John H. Langbein—an author whose article is widely recognized on the issue, notably by Justice Ginsburg in her Davila
concurrence.105 First, Justice Scalia had to amend his views of restitution as an appropriate form of relief in order to maintain his position
against monetary damages.106 Accordingly, he distinguished restitution in law and in equity.107 The plaintiff could not impose personal
liability on the defendant, as such would constitute restitution in
law.108 Yet, had Justice Scalia paid more attention to the same text he
relied on to revive the antiquated definition of “equity” in Mertens,
he would have found that the plan, as the “equitable assignee” in
subrogation cases, should have a right to restitution of repaid funds
in equity.109 Another significant problem lies in the fact that neither
100. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 223.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 225–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 230 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (1994)).
105. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 224 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Langbein, supra note 32, at 1319).
106. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1357.
107. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210–12.
108. Id. at 214.
109. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1358.
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restitution nor mandamus existed in equity before the divided bench,
only quasi-contract and constructive trusts did.110 This brings into
question the validity of Justice Scalia’s Mertens opinion, which originally included restitution as a form of relief “typically available in equity.”111 Also, Justice Scalia’s inflexible interpretation would permit
plan beneficiaries, such as the defendant in Mertens, to use ERISA as
an “instrument of fraud” against their plan.112 These are some serious flaws that call Justice Scalia’s whole logic into question.
Thus, we see from the Court’s complicated history that the future of individual compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary duty
under § 502(a)(3) is nearly impossible to predict. On the one end of
the tug-of-war is Justice Scalia’s textualist camp, insisting on a limited interpretation of § 502(a)(3) that leaves most injured ERISA
plan participants without compensatory relief. On the other end is
Justice Stevens’s purposivist camp, relying on common law trust
principles to provide a broader, make-whole standard for compensatory relief under § 502(a)(3). And more recently, the replacements
of two swing voters on this issue—former Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O’Connor—could tip the scales in either direction.
With that background of the Court’s general approach to
§502(a)(3) jurisprudence, the Pegram case, laid out below, illustrates
in particular the Court’s approach to HMOs under ERISA’s remedial scheme.
B. Plugging HMO Breach of Fiduciary Duty into the
ERISA § 502(a)(3) Equation
1. Pegram v. Herdrich: Davila Precursor
Pegram v. Herdrich113 was a noteworthy precursor in 2000 that
helped set the stage for the Davila decision. Like Davila, this case
concerned HMO liability for the treatment of its employee plan participants. The HMO in this case, Carle Care, was owned by physicians that provided prepaid medical care under employer contracts.114
Dr. Pegram required Ms. Herdrich to wait eight days to have an ul110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

1604

Id. at 1357.
Id.; see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
Langbein, supra note 32, at 1358.
530 U.S. 211 (2000).
Id. at 215.
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trasound of her abdomen.115 It was during this delay that her appendix burst, resulting in peritonitis.116 Accordingly, Ms. Herdrich
originally filed state claims for medical malpractice and for fraud.
When defendants removed the case to federal court under ERISA
preemption, she amended her complaint to include a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.
In order to determine Carle’s liability for a breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA, the Supreme Court had to consider whether
treatment decisions made by HMO physician employees of an
ERISA-regulated plan constituted fiduciary acts.117 The “threshold
question” for ERISA breach of fiduciary duty was “not whether the
actions of some person employed to provide services under a plan
adversely affected a plan beneficiary’s interest, but whether that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, was performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to complaint.”118 An ERISA
plan administrator may wear many hats, but he or she must wear
only one hat at a time, meaning the administrator is a fiduciary for
the purposes of ERISA only when he or she acts in that capacity. 119
Indeed, to argue the existence of injury before the existence of a
duty would put the cart before the horse.
The Court distinguished this case, where Carle’s physicians made
mixed treatment and eligibility decisions, from situations involving
pure eligibility decisions.120 According to the Court, pure eligibility
decisions were strictly administrative actions—clearly part of ERISA
fiduciary duty.121 But mixed treatment and eligibility decisions were
not fiduciary decisions.122
One of the Court’s primary concerns with mixed eligibility decisions was the troublesome task of separating pure eligibility decisions
from treatment decisions and the impact that may have on claims.123
Most HMO plans require a determination of “medical necessity” for

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. Peritonitis is in general an inflammation of the abdominal cavity.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 228–29.
See id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 228.
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coverage eligibility.124 The opinion of the treating physician generally
holds great weight in the determination of “medical necessity.”125 In
mixed decisions, however, the employee physician is making both
kinds of decisions: “medical necessity” and coverage.126 To further
complicate the matter, quite often the physician is not deciding
whether to cover a condition, but when and how to treat the condition so as to constitute a covered “medical necessity.”127 The Court
reasoned that an HMO could possibly claim medical judgment in
defense of its eligibility decision.128 In addition, the Court pointed
out that participants may also cloak their medical malpractice cases as
ERISA fiduciary duty claims to access HMOs’ deeper pockets, in addition to the claims against the physician.129 Or, in the alternative,
HMOs may use this same tool to successfully remove cases to federal
courts—a more agreeable jurisdiction for them, as explained earlier.130
Hence, the Court believed that to allow ERISA preemption of
mixed eligibility decisions would erode the distinction between state
malpractice and federal ERISA actions.131 Such an allowance would
render any medical malpractice claims of HMO physicians in state
court superfluous,132 no doubt clogging the federal courts with litigation. As a result, federal judges would have to integrate local
medical malpractice standards into federal ERISA fiduciary cases if
mixed decisions were considered fiduciary acts.133 Obviously, the
Court explained, Congress did not intend ERISA to have such farreaching ramifications.134 Therefore, the Court unanimously concluded that mixed decisions were not fiduciary actions.135 Because
the physician’s decision in this case did not constitute a fiduciary act,

124. Id. at 229.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 228–29.
128. Id. at 235.
129. Id. at 235–36. It may also be used as a mechanism to collect attorneys’ fees. Id.; see
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2000).
130. See supra Part II.D.
131. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 450 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at
235–36).
132. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235.
133. Id. at 236.
134. Id. at 237.
135. Id.
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there was no need to determine whether there had been a breach of
fiduciary duty.136
2. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila: On the Brink of Defining Remedies
Finally, in 2004 the Davila case presented the Court with claims
for breaches of fiduciary duty against HMOs. In Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila,137 the U.S. Supreme Court combined two ERISA preemption cases. In one case, described at the beginning of this paper,
Aetna’s denial of coverage for Vioxx pain medication compelled Juan
Davila to resort to a less expensive pain medication that Aetna would
cover—a decision that led to severe intestinal bleeding and damage.138 The other respondent, Ruby Calad, suffered complications
when CIGNA cut short her post-surgery hospital stay—a decision
that resulted in rehospitalization.139 Both respondents alleged in state
court that denial of coverage for recommended treatment constituted a breach of ordinary care in making treatment decisions under
the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA) and was the proximate cause of their injuries.140
The HMO petitioners successfully removed the cases to federal
court under an ERISA § 502(a) preemption theory.141 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit held that the claims were not preempted because
they were seeking tort damages, not benefit reimbursement.142
Complete preemption occurs when state causes of action duplicate
those contained in ERISA § 502(a).143 Since THCLA does not provide for benefit reimbursement, it does not “duplicate the causes of
action listed in ERISA.”144 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
case should not be preempted.145
Reversing the circuit court’s decision, the Supreme Court held
that ERISA completely preempts the THCLA claim for breach of

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
542 U.S. 200 (2004).
Id. at 205; see also Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002).
Davila, 542 U.S. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id. (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375–77 (2002)).
Id.
See id.
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ordinary care.146 Since the respondents’ coverage denial claims were
merely in regard to the administration of their benefits, their claims
fell within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) fiduciary duties.147
Moreover, the Court reasoned that permitting state law to supplement § 502(a) remedies would undermine congressional intent that
§ 502(a)(1)(B) causes of action remain exclusive.148
Relying on the Court’s reasoning in Pegram v. Herdrich,149 the
respondents contended that their cases should not be preempted
since they did not relate to employee benefits.150 The Court distinguished its holding in Pegram from the instant cases. It limited Pegram’s reach to mixed eligibility cases where the treating physician
also made benefit administration decisions—that is, where the plan
coverage “eligibility decision and the treatment decision were inextricably mixed.”151 In contrast, the plan administrators in these instant cases were “neither respondents’ treating physicians nor the
employers of respondents’ treating physicians.”152 Furthermore, the
respondents only claimed recovery for denial of benefits—a pure eligibility decision.153 Therefore, since pure eligibility decisions are fiduciary acts under Pegram, these cases fell under ERISA fiduciary
regulation154 and should be completely preempted.155
The Court mentioned the Government’s suggestion that
§ 502(a)(3) could potentially provide make-whole relief to the respondents.156 Yet, since respondents failed to amend their pleadings
to include § 502(a), the scope of § 502(a) and the remedies thereby
available were out of the Court’s reach to decide.157 With no other
146. Id. at 214.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 216.
149. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
150. Davila, 542 U.S. at 218.
151. Id. (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229).
152. Id. at 221.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 218–19.
155. Id. at 214, 221. The Court also held that these state claims are not saved from preemption even if the state law regulating insurance only generally duplicates or supplements
ERISA § 502(a), rather than exactly duplicating ERISA, because of the overpowering comprehensiveness intended with § 502(a). See Davila, 542 U.S. at 216.
156. Id. at 221 n.7.
157. Id.; see also Scott Rhodes, Note, ERISA Strikes Back: Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila’s
Use of ERISA To Strike Down the Texas Health Care Liability Act, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 481,
499 (2005) (citing Davila, 542 U.S. at 221 n.7).
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issues to address, the cases were remanded for further proceedings,
but the parties did not pursue the case further.158 And so, the fiduciary loophole for ERISA § 502(a) remedies evaded the Court’s consideration.
Justice Ginsburg, in her sympathetic concurrence, encouraged
Congress and the Court to correct ERISA’s “regulatory vacuum,”
which generally leaves plan participants without relief.159 Moreover,
she further elaborated on make-whole relief which the Court had
mentioned might be available under ERISA160—a potential loophole
to the seemingly hopeless “regulatory vacuum.”161
The aforementioned cases illustrate the sharp division within the
Court over the scope of § 502(a)(3) relief. At present, the Supreme
Court has not yet precluded compensatory damages against an
ERISA fiduciary. The plaintiffs in the Varity case, which was decided
in between Mertens and Great-West, were awarded equitable relief
against a fiduciary in the form of reinstatement, not monetary damages.162 As the Government pointed out in its amicus brief in Davila,
both the Mertens and Great-West decisions involved claims against
non-fiduciaries.163 In addition, the mixed decisions at issue in Pegram were also considered non-fiduciary acts.164 Finally, the Court
again missed the opportunity to address damages against a fiduciary
in Davila because the plaintiffs did not pursue any issues beyond
complete preemption.165 Thus, it remains to be seen whether the
Court’s textualists or purposivists will allow trust law remedies under
ERISA § 502(a)(3)—specifically make-whole compensatory relief—
against a breaching HMO fiduciary.

158. Calad v. CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 388 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2004).
159. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)).
160. Id. at 221 n.7 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at 223–24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
162. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
163. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27 n.13, Davila,
542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 249 (1993).
164. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
165. Davila, 542 U.S. at 221 n.7.
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IV. SCALIA V. STEVENS: TEXT OR PURPOSE
As evidenced by the above line of cases, a nearly-even division
has emerged among the Justices of the Court, each side staunchly
advancing its respective interpretation of ERISA § 502(a)(3) relief.
Claiming to use a strict textual approach, Justice Scalia’s camp supports a narrow interpretation of “equitable relief” to protect only the
integrity of the plan itself.166 On the other side, Justice Stevens’s
camp applies common law trust principles to award a broader range
of make-whole compensatory damages to individuals, as well as the
plan.167 But with the delicate balance that already exists within the
Supreme Court and the recent turnover in justices, this tug-of-war
between Scalia’s interpretation and Stevens’s interpretation could go
either way.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet precluded compensatory
damages for individual plan beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty,
the Scalia camp’s unwavering treatment of strictly applying the language of § 502(a)(3) suggests it is inevitable. First, the Court set the
stage to preclude compensatory damages in Russell by expressing its
reluctance to “tamper” with a “comprehensive and reticulated” enforcement scheme so carefully crafted in ERISA.168 The Court further expressed that ERISA’s fiduciary liability provision and corresponding enforcement provision were intended to protect the plan as
a whole, rather than the individual plan beneficiaries.169
Second, the Scalia camp attributes its § 502(a) interpretation
generally out of strict allegiance to clear congressional intent. In particular, as Justice Scalia aptly put it, “It is, however, not our job to
find reasons for what Congress has plainly done; and it is our job to
avoid rendering what Congress has plainly done (here, limit the
available relief) devoid of reason and effect.”170 Indeed, Justice Scalia
insisted that if Congress had intended to authorize such broad relief
as the dissent interpreted § 502(a) to provide, it would have simply

166. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 522–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mertens, 508 U.S. at
256–57.
167. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 266–67 (White, J., dissenting).
168. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1985) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)); see also Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 147).
169. Russell, 473 U.S. at 142.
170. Great-West Life Annuity & Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217–18 (2002).
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said so in the statute.171 Another example of the Court’s blind obedience to the text of the statute is in part of Justice Stevens’s rationale
for denying relief to a plan participant for detrimental delay in benefit claims processing—“the text of ERISA does not explicitly regulate
‘the possible consequences of delay in the plan administrators’ processing of a disputed claim.’”172 Although Justice Stevens has since
made an about-face in his views, Justice Scalia was still convinced in
Mertens that trust law would provide a broader range of remedies
than Congress intended.173 Hence, Justice Scalia’s side insists that
Congress intended his narrow construction of ERISA § 502(a)(3).
Last, and more importantly, the Court’s insistence in Mertens
that compensatory damages are not “appropriate equitable relief” as
contained in ERISA § 502 in the non-fiduciary context will likely
carry over to the fiduciary context.174 In the Great-West opinion, the
Scalia camp expressly reinforced that it would not vary its interpretation of § 502 depending on the context by carving out one exclusive, narrow exception—allowing only “restitution traditionally available in equity,” or non-legal relief.175 In other words, “for restitution
to lie in equity,” the plaintiff cannot impose personal liability on the
defendant, as it would be considered legal relief, except to recover
identifiable money in the defendant’s possession that “in good conscience” belongs to the plaintiff.176 Interestingly enough, contrary to
the pattern set by Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer’s Varity opinion indicated that § 502(a)(3) does cover breaches of fiduciary duty.177
171. Id. at 218. One could also argue the opposite: if Congress had intended such a narrow definition of “other appropriate equitable relief” as the majority interpreted ERISA
§ 502(a) to provide, it would have expressly said so.
172. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1328 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 144).
173. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257–58 (1993).
174. See id. at 256 (limiting the scope of “other appropriate equitable relief” in ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) to “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)”); see also Great-West, 534
U.S. at 221 (holding that ERISA § 502(a)(3) does not authorize legal relief); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Almost invariably . . . suits
seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a
sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.”); Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 (holding that ERISA § 409 only authorizes extra-contractual damages to the plan itself, not to plan beneficiaries). And “[m]oney
damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.” Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
175. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214.
176. Id. at 213–14.
177. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510 (1996).
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Justice Thomas weighed in on the issue of “appropriate equitable
relief” for the Scalia camp. In his dissent to the Varity opinion, he
“conclude[d] that Congress intended §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) to provide the exclusive mechanism for bringing claims of breach of fiduciary duty,” indicating rather clearly that he opposed individual relief
for breach of fiduciary duty.178 And, buried in a footnote at the end
of the Great-West decision, Justice Scalia clarified Justice Thomas’s
dissent, emphasizing the limited spectrum of equitable remedies
available under § 502(a)(3), even in the fiduciary context.179
Whereby the Scalia camp implied, as some lower courts have reasoned, that “the status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or nonfiduciary, does not affect the question of whether damages constitute
‘appropriate equitable relief’ under § 502(a)(3).”180 Therefore, it
seems the fiduciary context would likely present a distinction that
would not make a difference for the Scalia camp in its narrow application of § 502(a)(3).
In contrast, Justice Stevens’s camp would likely include makewhole remedies under its broad interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty. The first and foremost reason is that one of the primary purposes of ERISA, expressly
written into the text of the statute, was to protect the “interests of
participants in employee benefit plans.”181
Second, from the fact that ERISA was originally conceived from
common law trust principles, it was obvious to the Stevens camp that
Congress actually intended ERISA to provide a broad frame under
which the courts could apply make-whole compensatory relief.182
Third, also written in the text of the statute are monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(5), which should be

178. Id. at 520 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221 n.5 (clarifying its decision in Varity Corp., 516 U.S.
489, a breach of fiduciary duty case where the Court allowed reinstatement as appropriate equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3)).
180. Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y., 392 F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint, Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Calhoon v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he statutory language does not
condition available remedies on the defendant’s identity, but simply states that ‘a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary’ may bring a civil action ‘to obtain other appropriate equitable relief’
to enforce the act or the plan.” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3))).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
182. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496–97, 502–03.
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applied to § 502(a)(3).183 After the Russell decision, the Court
pointed out in Varity that § 502(l) of ERISA provides for payment
of civil penalties by breaching fiduciaries to plan participants and
beneficiaries (as well as to the plan) for claims brought under
§ 502(a)(5), which language is nearly identical to § 502(a)(3).184
The difference is that § 502(a)(5) only authorizes suits by the Secretary of Labor, whereas § 502(a)(3) also includes suits by participants
and beneficiaries.185 So, contrary to the Court’s prior Russell opinion,
the Court held in Varity that ERISA does not preclude individual recovery
for
breach
of
fiduciary
duty
under
§ 502(a)(3).186
Fourth, as Justice Ginsburg has pointed out, the only decisions
denying individual relief under § 502(a)(3) were against nonfiduciaries.187
And fifth, restitution, like that which the Scalia majority ruled as
“appropriate” in both Mertens and Great-West, is a form of monetary
relief in equity.188 Hence, there exists overwhelming support favoring
monetary damages under § 502(a)(3) for individual plan beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty.
Most lower courts remain loyal to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “appropriate” equitable relief in Great-West, though some
183. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l).
184. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)). But see id. at 525 n.4
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (reasoning that ERISA § 502(l) is not an indication that Congress
intended individual relief under § 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty because § 502(l) was
enacted over a decade later); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260–61 (1993) (indicating that ERISA § 502(l) penalties are only awarded when there has been a transfer to the
plan of money or property). It should be noted that Varity was decided after Mertens, so the
later ruling should stand. Mertens is based on a proposed regulation, Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration, 55 Fed. Reg. 25, 288–89 & n.9 (proposed June 20, 1990). Even if an
agency’s proposed regulation held any weight, it should not after the Varity decision. And because § 502(l) is unambiguous in allowing for individual relief for a breach of fiduciary duty,
the administrative proposal holds no weight. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
185. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510.
186. Id. at 510, 515.
187. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27–28 &
n.13, Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83)).
188. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 215 (2002);
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251, 261–63.
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were obedient somewhat reluctantly.189 For example, before GreatWest, the Second Circuit in Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. held that
make-whole relief was appropriate as restitution for an alleged breach
of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3).190 However, the Supreme
Court’s Great-West dictum supposedly has added a new gloss to its
meaning: restitution damages are available only in very limited circumstances.191 Accordingly, in the wake of that landmark decision,
many lower courts, including the Second Circuit, have since rejected
Strom and declined to extend common law trust remedies—such as
restitution
or
any
other
legal
remedies—to
§ 502(a)(3).192 Those determined ineligible for benefits would have
no claim to benefits that were never theirs.193 Indeed, the Second
189. Davila, 542 U.S. at 223 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 467 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The vital thing . . . is that either Congress or the
Court act quickly, because the current situation is plainly untenable.”); Cicio v. Does, 321
F.3d 83, 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the “gaping
wound” caused by the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as interpreted by this Court, “will not be healed” until the Court either “start[s] over” or Congress
“wipe[s] the slate clean”); see also McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378 & n.2
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 30 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that the plaintiffs could not recover tax liabilities from lump sum payments because
“Mertens precludes make-whole damages which are not equitable in nature,” regardless of
whether the claims are against a fiduciary or non-fiduciary)); Hein v. F.D.I.C., 88 F.3d 210,
223–24 (3d Cir. 1996); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822, 828–29 (10th Cir.
1995); Fraser v. Lintas: Campbell-Ewald, 56 F.3d 722, 725 (6th Cir. 1995); Lee v. Burkhart,
991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759–61 (8th
Cir. 1992); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 654–60 (7th Cir. 1992); McRae v. Seafarers’
Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1991); Sommers Drug Stores Co. v. Corrigan
Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1462–64 (5th Cir. 1986); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424–25 (4th Cir. 1985).
190. 202 F.3d 138, 144–45, 150 (holding that, for a breach of fiduciary duty, restitution
would be “equitable relief” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)); see also Bowerman
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 592 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to the equitable remedy of restitution).
191. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214.
192. See, e.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 339–40 (2d Cir. 2005); Calhoon v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 2005); Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 392
F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004); Kollman v. Hewitt Assocs., No. Civ.A.03–2944, 2005 WL
1941658, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2005). Restitution is measured by a defendant’s unjust
“gain, not on the plaintiff’s loss.” Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting 3 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.1(1), at 9 (West Publishing, Co. 1993)
(1973)); see also Strom, 202 F.3d at 145 (“[B]reach of fiduciary duty . . . [is] a claim that always has been within the exclusive jurisdiction of equity and that never has required a showing
of unjust enrichment.”).
193. See Kollman, 2005 WL 1941658, at *12 (citing Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211–14)
(holding that front pay is not an acceptable form of equitable damages since it never belonged
to the plaintiff).
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Circuit summarized the lower courts’ reliance on the Great-West dictum well: “Despite the sweep of the language from the Restatement
supporting actions in equity against fiduciaries for breach of their duties . . . I am persuaded that the Supreme Court’s dictum in GreatWest, sends a signal that should not be ignored.”194 Therefore, as it
now stands, the majority of lower courts have not pursued Justice
Ginsburg’s proposal for a fiduciary exception.
Unlike the lower federal courts, the outcome of this tug-of-war
in the Court over the scope of § 502(a)(3) will be a close finish, focusing briefly on just numbers. In review, on one end, Justice Scalia
is joined by Justice Thomas, adopting a narrow interpretation of
“appropriate equitable remedies.”195 And on the other end, Justice
Breyer and Justice Stevens maintain a broader definition based on
trust principles.196 The other remaining Justices, such as the classic
swing-voters Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, have played on
both sides.197 Justice Stevens actually switched sides between the
Russell and Mertens decisions.198 Also, Mertens and Great-West were
both narrow wins (five-to-four) for the Scalia camp.199 Varity was a
broader six-to-three victory for the Stevens camp.200 And Davila,
though unanimous, never addressed the issue of remedies.201 With
two new Justices joining the bench (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito) to replace two middle-ground Justices (the former Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor), the future of this issue is
uncertain.
V. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT FAVORS STEVENS
Though the Court’s ultimate outcome in this tug-of-war over
§ 502(a)(3) “equitable” relief may seem uncertain, one thing is
plain: Justice Stevens’s camp clearly has a more appropriate approach. Justice Scalia’s textualist/originalist approach is simply too

194. Pereira, 413 F.3d at 346 (Newman, J., concurring).
195. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1993).
196. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496, 512, 515 (1996).
197. See id.; see also Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208; Mertens, 508 U.S. 248.
198. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
199. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 206; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 249.
200. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 491.
201. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
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myopic to encompass the true congressional intent.202 Justice Scalia
would leave ERISA plans without any meaningful regulation of their
eligibility decisions and plan participants without any meaningful
remedies,203 especially given the fact that ERISA preempts any claims
related to benefit plans.204 With no enforceable fiduciary duty to plan
participants under ERISA, HMOs are not accountable for their injurious actions. Surely, lawmakers would not intend such a result. Using Justice Stevens’s more suitable approach, courts should award
ERISA plan participants at least make-whole compensatory damages
for breach of fiduciary duty205 via Justice Ginsburg’s illusive loophole
mentioned in Davila. First, ERISA expressly indicates one of its primary purposes: to impose duties on the plan fiduciaries to protect
the individual plan participants and beneficiaries.206 Second, since
ERISA was indisputably founded on common law trust principles,207
it stands to reason that Congress intended the courts to apply those
trust principles to ERISA claims, rather than Justice Scalia’s abandoned principles from the divided bench.208 Finally, with the more
recent rise of HMOs to dominate the health care industry, ERISA’s
far-reaching impact on something as complex as HMO liability was
surely beyond anything Congress fathomed years prior upon the
statute’s creation. For this reason, Justice Stevens’s make-whole approach may not actually be the best approach to HMO fiduciary liability, but it is the only approach that would make sense under
ERISA, as it now stands, to provide more feasible relief to injured
202. See Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation,
75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 10 (2004) (“With regard to statutes and the Constitution, the core
commitment of Justice Scalia’s textualist originalist view is that judicial interpretation should
aim to discern the ‘objective indication of the words’ as they would have been understood at
the time of their enactment. This view is textualist because it takes statutory or constitutional
text as the sole interpretive object, and it is originalist because it seeks to capture the understanding of the text at the time of enactment, as opposed to at the time of interpretation (or
some other time).” (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION 3, 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1996))). Wherefore, Justice Scalia strayed
from his own credo by adopting an interpretation of “equitable” that “would [not] have been
understood at the time of [ERISA’s] enactment.” Id.
203. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–57.
204. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
205. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 223 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding no reason why Congress would deny such relief).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
207. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996).
208. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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plan participants. Therefore, it is evident that ERISA’s remedial
scheme deserves further consideration by Congress, its creator—not
further creativity in the courts.
Section A will discuss one of Justice Stevens’s strongest justifications for interpreting § 502(a)(3) to provide compensatory relief to
plan participants, which is to support the purposes Congress expressly included in the statute. Then, in light of ERISA’s express
purposes, as well as its trust law foundation, Section B will consider §
502(a)(3) application in the trust law context. Section C explains
how Justice Scalia’s approach would in essence legitimize fraudulent
HMO behavior. Section D describes ERISA’s impact on HMO liability.
A. Comprehensive Statutory Language of ERISA
Like most laws, ERISA was not created in a vacuum. Courts have
other sources to help shed light on that troublesome little phrase
“other appropriate equitable relief.”209 The Supreme Court basically
debated whether Congress intended to base ERISA § 502(a)(3)
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty on trust law or on remedies
available in equity during the practice of separate courts of law and
of equity.210 Justice Stevens’s purposivist camp relied on the overall
purposes behind ERISA to support the former theory,211 whereas
Justice Scalia’s textualist camp supported the latter theory solely on a
textual basis of one word in the statute: “equitable.”212 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Varity, emphasized that “[w]e should
expect that courts, in fashioning ‘appropriate’ equitable relief, will
keep in mind the ‘special nature and purpose of employee benefit
plans,’ and will respect the ‘policy choices reflected in the inclusion
of certain remedies and the exclusion of others.’”213 Indeed, Justice
Stevens did just that, finding ample support for his assertions not
only in the text of the statute, but also in the legislative history.

209. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
210. See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 225–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993).
213. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987), and citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263–64, and Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)).
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As already mentioned, ERISA itself indicates the statute was intended to “provid[e] . . . appropriate remedies” to its participants.214
The text of the statute contains the general purposes Congress intended the statute to promote—namely, to protect the interests of
participants and beneficiaries by (1) establishing fiduciary standards
and (2) “providing for appropriate remedies” and “ready access to
the Federal courts.”215 What is more, ERISA fiduciaries are expected
to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”216
Along with those direct statements, ERISA’s language also contains more subtle indications that Congress intended to enforce fiduciary obligations under ERISA. To begin with, comparing ERISA’s
pension plan provisions to non-pension welfare benefit plan provisions suggests the concern Congress had in fiduciary regulation of
ERISA plan administration.217 ERISA covers both pension plans and
non-pension welfare benefit plans, which include medical, surgical,
accident, and health programs.218 As for pension plans, Title I of
ERISA provides strict rules in such areas as funding, vesting, an anticutback rule, plan termination insurance for the employer, and fiduciary duties in managing the plan benefits.219 In contrast, Congress
excluded welfare benefit plans from these Title I rules with the notable exception of fiduciary duty in managing the plan benefits—a
strong indication of the import fiduciary law holds in welfare benefit
plan administration.220 Another subtle example of fiduciary enforcement
is
the
aforementioned
civil
penalties
in
§ 502(l), awarded to the plan and to participants for breach of fiduciary duty under §§ 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(5), which is nearly identical to § 502(a)(3).221
Thus, even if the Court were to go strictly by the “comprehensive” language of the statute, the Court would clearly reach the same
result as Justice Stevens reached. Even the legislative history indi-

214. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
215. Id.
216. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
217. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1323.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l).
219. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1322; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1).
220. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1323–24 (citing ERISA §§ 201(1), 301(a)(1),
4021(a)(1)).
221. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510, 515 (1996); see also supra note 184 and
accompanying text.
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cated that Congress intended to provide broad remedies for breach
of fiduciary duty.222 Indeed, “[g]iven these objectives, it is hard to
imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries
a remedy.”223
The Mertens majority, led by Justice Scalia, relied on a few other
provisions of the statute to distinguish legal remedies from equitable
remedies. For example, the placement together of both the terms
“equitable” and “legal,” as well as “equitable” and “remedial,” in a
few other provisions of the statute were distinguishing factors, according to the majority’s opinion.224 Hence, according to the majority, legal remedies cannot be considered equitable. From that, Justice
Scalia inferred that § 502(a)(3) included only those remedies “typically available in equity” from the days of the divided bench.225 Not
only has the divided bench been long-retired from the court system,
but also, as the dissent pointed out, those provisions the majority relied on made the distinction out of necessity because it had no trust
law analogue to refer to.226 Hence, Justice Scalia missed the mark by
narrowly deciphering the word “equity” in the wrong context with
the rest of the statute—failing to consider those purposes Congress
actually wrote into the text of the statute.

222. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 512 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (describing Senate version of enforcement provisions as intended to “provide both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad
remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]”), and citing H.R. REP. NO. 93533, at 17 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 (describing Senate version
in identical terms)).
223. Id. at 513.
224. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258–59 (1993).
225. Id. at 256–57. This system, which typically did not award legal or monetary damages in courts of equity, was abandoned in the 1930s. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 224 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “The rarified rules underlying
this rigid and time-bound conception of the term ‘equity’ were hardly at the fingertips of those
who enacted § 502(a)(3).” Id. “By 1974, when ERISA became law, the ‘days of the divided
bench’ were a fading memory, for that era had ended nearly 40 years earlier with the advent of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 224–25.
226. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 269–70 (White, J., dissenting). Although the majority
claims it has such an analogue, id. at 259 n.9 (majority opinion), the dissent points out it is
quite tenuous, at best. Id. at 269 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
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B. Trust Law Foundation
Fiduciary duties have a well-established foundation in trust law.
For instance, the fiduciary duties described in ERISA, such as duty of
loyalty,227 duty of prudence,228 and benefit determinations,229 obviously parallel trust law language.230 And, in the HMO context, the
Supreme Court looked at plan benefits as a “medical trust.”231
Although there is little doubt that ERISA was originally derived
from trust law principles,232 there is some question as to what extent
trust law is reflected in ERISA.233 Yet, another look at the Court’s
own case law, the legislative history, and even the statute itself clearly
provide the answer: courts should use trust common law—which is
settled and contemporary—as the template for deciding the scope of
“appropriate equitable relief” rather than referring to Justice Scalia’s
antiquated system. Put plainly in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, the Court stated that

227. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”).
228. An ERISA fiduciary is to exercise “the care, skill, prudence, and diligence” of a
“prudent man acting in a like capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering
the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing
with his own property.”).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (requiring ERISA plans to follow written claims procedures for
benefit denial, to give reasons for denials, and to provide for review of denials “by the appropriate named fiduciary”).
230. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1324–29; see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,
224 (2000) (“These responsibilities imposed by ERISA have the familiar ring of their source in
the common law of trusts.”).
231. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004).
232. See, e.g., Pegram, 530 U.S. at 224.
233. “[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees.” 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). In addition to the trustees, ERISA also provides that fiduciary duties apply to any of those that administer the plan or exercise any discretion over the plan benefits. Id. § 1002(21)(A). See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (“The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and
skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property.”). But see
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264–65 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “congress intended that the
courts would look to the settled experience of the common law” to give shape to ERISA plans
and “it is to the common law of trusts that we must look” to determine the correct scope of
relief); Langbein, supra note 32, at 1324.
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ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(7) (“participant”), 1002(8) (“beneficiary”), 1002(21)(A) (“fiduciary”), 1103(a) (“trustee”), 1104 (“fiduciary duties”). ERISA’s legislative history confirms that the Act’s
fiduciary responsibility provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114,
“codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.” Given this
language and history, we have held that courts are to develop a
“federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISAregulated plans.”234

In Firestone, the Court applied trust law to fill in the blank for
the appropriate standard of review for a denial of plan participants’
benefits, unanimously holding that de novo review was the appropriate standard.235 As Professor Langbein indicated, “[t]he core fallacy
of the majority opinion in Russell, which has carried over to Mertens
and Great-West, is to confuse applying with implying.”236 In other
words, Justice Scalia’s camp mistakenly inferred that Congress, by
implication, intentionally omitted certain remedies from ERISA
rather than applying the trust law principles to fashion “appropriate
equitable remedies,” as Congress intended. For instance, the ERISA
§ 404(a) fiduciary duty description and the § 502(a)(3) “catchall”
remedy provision were only generally described.237 And, as Professor
Langbein pointed out, Congress also left out a statute of limitations,
a jury trial requirement, a standard of review, when attorney fees are

234. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (citing Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)) (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24
n.26 (1983) (“[A] body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.” (quoting 120
CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits))). “ERISA’s legislative history confirms
that the Act’s fiduciary responsibility provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114, ‘codif[y] and
mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the
law of trusts.’” Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973), as
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649).
235. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 115.
236. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1343. “Accordingly, interpreting Congress’s term ‘appropriate equitable relief’ to cover so predictable and recurrent a case as fiduciary breach resulting in consequential injury entails applying the cause of action Congress created, not implying
a cause of action that Congress omitted.” Id. at 1344.
237. Id. The Court referred to ERISA §§ 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(5) as “catchall” provisions. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (“This structure suggests that these
‘catchall’ provisions act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused
by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy.”).
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appropriate, and whether punitive damages are permissible.238 Indeed, “when enacting ERISA Congress was transposing the trust
model into regulatory law for the newly federalized field of pension
and employee benefit plans.”239
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly indicated in the statute,
common law trust principles should apply by default to develop “appropriate equitable relief” for breaches of fiduciary duty, just as Justice Ginsburg suggested in Davila.240 Trust law traditionally provides
make-whole relief in various instances, such as for “[a]cts of ‘negligence or misconduct in the making or retaining of investments.’”241
It stands to reason that such a remedy could apply to ERISA fiduciary liability cases. Justice Scalia even stated that the meaning of §
502(a)(3) relief “remains a question of interpretation in each case
which meaning is intended.”242 The make-whole standard, a “core
principle of trust remedy law, . . . restores the victim to the positions
that he or she would have had ‘if there had been no breach of
trust.’”243 Trust law allows for specific performance and restitution,
as well as monetary damages.244 In fact, the Uniform Trust Code
provides that “[t]o remedy a breach of trust . . . the court may . . .
compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying money.”245
“The trust remedy tradition grew up in equity and remains, in the

238. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1345. The courts have addressed some of these issues
and “filled in the blanks.” See, e.g., Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108–09 (stating that “federal courts
have adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard” of review); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (holding that fiduciaries are not liable for punitive
damages).
239. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1343–44.
240. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264–65 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
(citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110).
241. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1337 (quoting GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862, at 38 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)). Langbein refers to one such example of trust law application in an executor’s administration of a probate
estate. Id. (citing In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 298 (N.Y. 1977)).
242. Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 256–57.
243. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1335 (quoting 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT &
WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)).
244. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) (“[A]
plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.” (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a (1936); 3 DOBBS, supra note 192, at 587–
88; GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.4, at 17, § 3.7, at 262 (1978))).
245. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(b)(3) (amended 2001), 7C U.L.A. 221 (Supp. 2003).
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words of the Restatement of Trusts, ‘exclusively equitable.’”246 And,
“there is no reason to suspect that Congress intended to base ERISA
on the law of trusts while omitting the predicate law’s core remedy.”247 Thus, trust law does include compensatory damages as an
available equitable remedy.
Nevertheless, ignoring those aspects of the trust remedy law as
“other appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA,248 Justice Scalia’s
overly-restrictive “categories of relief that were typically available in
equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)”249 effectively provide no relief at all to most victims wrongfully denied or delayed benefits by HMOs. And a “crime”
(in this case, a cause of action) with no punishment, is no crime at
all, as explained in the following section.
C. Negative Effects of HMOs’ ERISA Shield
Including a cause of action in ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty
that preempts state law claims yet denies individual compensatory relief creates a vehicle for HMOs to defraud. With no enforceable liability outside of injunction and restitution, the denial of individual
relief provides further incentive for HMOs to deny or short-change
medical coverage to ERISA plan participants, legitimizing what may
seem to some people an already common HMO practice. Indeed,
one of the foremost reasons for which Justice Scalia’s approach is enticing to HMOs is the liability shield ERISA provides them. Participants in the midst of medical crises are generally in no position to
appeal their beneficiary rights. And with only “equitable” remedies
under ERISA, as interpreted by the courts, the most that could happen is the HMO would be forced to cover only the medical treatment in question and not any resulting harm from the HMO’s decision to deny the physician’s prescribed medical treatment. By then,
the plaintiff is often seeking damages, not coverage, which are supposedly unavailable under ERISA’s § 502(a) civil enforcement provisions. Thus, one could say an HMO may literally get away with
murder.

246. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1320 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
197 (1959)).
247. DiFelice v. AETNA U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 466 (3d Cir. 2003).
248. See ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000).
249. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
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One is left to wonder why Justice Scalia would thus limit “other
appropriate equitable relief”—especially since most claims seeking
payment to the plaintiff, whether by judgment, declaration, or injunction, are “[a]lmost invariably” for loss caused by defendant’s
breach of fiduciary duty or legal damages.250 All that remains of
“typically equitable” remedies after Great-West is “(1) injunction, for
which Congress did not need to provide ‘other appropriate equitable
relief’ in [§] 502(a)(3), having already expressly authorized injunction earlier in the same sentence; and (2) restitution for cases that
might have been brought as constructive trust actions before fusion.”251 Indeed, Professor Langbein was puzzled at why the drafters
would hide the ball by calling it “other appropriate equitable relief”
if what they had really intended was just a constructive trust.252
Justice Scalia’s response was that § 502(a) was intended to protect the plan, not the plan beneficiaries.253 His reasoning referred
back to Justice Stevens’s concept of a comprehensive enforcement
scheme in his Russell decision.254 Since §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) were
the only places that expressly addressed breaches of fiduciary duty,
that was the only way Congress intended the courts to allow recovery for a breach of fiduciary duty.255 And, from the Russell decision,
those sections will not provide individual relief for breaches of fiduciary duty.256 In addition, in a further effort to protect plan assets, Justice Scalia rejected the application of current trust law principles as
too expansive (and perhaps expensive).257 He explained that Congress must have meant to limit the relief available by using the word
“equitable,” “[s]ince all relief available for breach of trust could be
obtained from a court of equity.”258 With nothing else to turn to—
no legislative history, no case law, not even the trust law ERISA was

250. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1360.
252. Id.
253. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 522–25 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
254. See id.
255. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 n.5 (2002).
256. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993).
257. Id. at 256–58, 262.
258. See id. However, it is worth noting that restitution, like that upheld in Mertens, is
based in trust law, further implicating the weakness of his stance against the application of trust
law. Id. at 256. In Great-West, Justice Scalia tried to cover his oversight by distinguishing restitution in equity from that in law. 534 U.S. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d
754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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based on—Justice Scalia unearthed ancient principles from the obsolete practice of a divided bench to reach a narrow definition of “equitable” that would favor protection to ERISA plans.259 In effect,
Justice Scalia’s strict textual approach was actually more of a
stretch—rejecting the “vague notion” of protecting plan beneficiaries
for protection of the plan assets themselves.260 In opposition to Justice Scalia’s baseless inferences, Justice Ginsberg stated appropriately,
The Court is no doubt correct that “vague notions of a statute’s
‘basic purpose’ are . . . inadequate to overcome the words of its
text regarding the specific issue under consideration.” But when
Congress’ clearly stated purpose so starkly conflicts with questionable inferences drawn from a single word in the statute, it is the latter, and not the former, that must give way.261

With the recent emergence of HMOs, the vast intricacies of
HMO administration, and the fact that the stakes are much higher
when dealing with people’s health than with their retirement funds,
perhaps HMOs should be held to a different fiduciary standard than
ordinary ERISA fiduciaries. Thus, ERISA’s application to HMO
plans deserves a closer look.
D. HMO Considerations
Despite Justice Scalia’s questionable justification supporting his
narrow definition of equity, his theory may have some redeeming
qualities in the context of emerging HMO liability. An argument
could be made that shifting focus of fiduciary duty of loyalty from
the plan to individual plan beneficiaries would inevitably lead to
costly consequences and confusion. Justice Scalia has even mentioned that increasing liability may induce higher costs, discouraging
employers from offering private benefit plans.262 Furthermore, as illustrated by the amicus curiae brief cited in Varity, plan administra259. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–58.
260. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 538–39 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Although Congress sought to guarantee that employees receive the welfare benefits promised by
employers, Congress was also aware that if the cost of providing welfare benefits rose too high,
employers would not provide them at all.”); see also Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (“Exposure to
that sort of liability would impose high insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with
and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans themselves.”).
261. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 227–28 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261).
262. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 538–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tive decisions will favor payment to the beneficiaries over preserving
plan assets, thereby hiking costs for ERISA plans.263 Non-expert
courts may place plan administrators’ “technical decisions” under the
microscope for closer supervision,264 and plaintiffs may cloak their
ordinary benefit claims as fiduciary duty claims.265 Thus, some legal
authorities, including Justice Scalia, reason that Congress must have
intended this restrictive remedial scheme for ERISA HMO plans.
Still, this is all speculative, especially in the HMO context. In
fact, none of these arguments were made in terms of HMOs and the
climbing medical costs that burden this country today. Without any
support of this theory precipitated anywhere, such as in the legislative history, it does not explain how Congress intended to apply
ERISA’s § 502 remedial scheme in HMO liability claims relating to
employee benefit plans. Because HMOs, in the form they exist today, did not dominate the health care industry at the time ERISA
was created, Congress could not have anticipated the extent of the
effects of HMO liability under ERISA benefit plan regulation. What
ERISA’s legislative history does demonstrate is that Congress intended to word the statute broadly (“other appropriate equitable relief”) in order to provide flexibility in employment benefit plan regulation, thereby leaving the federal courts to “fine-tune ERISA’s
remedial scheme” based on trust common law tradition.266 Or, as
Professor Langbein summarized Justice Stevens’s approach,
To expect express statutory regulation in ERISA concerning such
details of sound fiduciary practice misconceives how Congress constructed ERISA. What Congress did in ERISA was (1) to mandate
the trust device for all plan assets; (2) to make every person an
ERISA fiduciary who exercises any discretion over plan assets or
plan administration; and (3) to prescribe the core principles of trust
fiduciary law, loyalty and prudence, to govern all aspects of plan

263. Id. at 514 (majority opinion).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 513–14.
266. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152 n.6, 155, 157 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (citing several references in the legislative history indicating a clear
intent to extend trust fiduciary principles to employee benefit plans). For example, Senator
Jacob Javits, one of the principle authors of ERISA, reported to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare that “[i]t is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.” Id. at 156 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Javits)). But see supra note 168 and accompanying text.

1626

JOHNSON.MRO.DOC

1589]

2/6/2007 11:49:20 AM

Achilles’ Heel to HMOs’ Impenetrable ERISA Shield

administration. In consequence, Congress had no need to spell out
the details, and considerable reason not to do so when legislating
for a new field whose contours were not yet fully known.267

Though Justice Stevens’s camp has the more fitting approach for
ERISA plan management, the application of Justice Stevens’s interpretation of “other appropriate equitable relief” is simply not enough
in this context. The HMO liability problem is much bigger than
could be adequately covered by ERISA as it now stands. To begin
with, lumping HMOs into ERISA regulation has resulted in a regulatory vacuum that needs to be addressed by either Congress or the
Court. Injured plan participants have no effective relief under Justice
Scalia’s approach to ERISA’s remedial scheme. Along with plan participants’ lack of effective relief are complex cost issues, such as how
to balance the costs of providing benefits to plan participants, as Justice Stevens would suggest, while avoiding higher plan costs that
may result from increased HMO liability, as Justice Scalia would
suggest. Also, as demonstrated by the Pegram and Davila cases,
ERISA fiduciary duty is not always very black and white in HMO
benefit administration.268 Eligibility decisions are inescapably steeped
in medical treatment considerations, implying a more complex set of
standards than ERISA’s “comprehensive and reticulated” scheme
envisioned.
Thus, in response to the “regulatory vacuum” that has resulted
and to the recent rise of HMOs, Congress needs to reconsider §
502(a)’s application in the context of HMOs that breach their fiduciary duty.269 Meanwhile, courts should apply trust law principles to
effectuate ERISA’s intent of protecting plan participants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Had Juan Davila actually claimed § 502(a)(3) remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty, instead of limiting himself to appealing the
lower court’s decision for ERISA preemption of his state law claims,
267. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1328–29 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
268. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220–21 (2004); Pegram v. Herdrich,
530 U.S. 211, 235–36 (2000). “[W]hen an HMO guarantees medically necessary care, determinations of coverage in an emergency situation ‘cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments about reasonable medical treatment.’” Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355, 383 (2002) (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229).
269. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. AETNA
U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)).
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the viability of Justice Ginsburg’s loophole would no longer remain a
mystery. Thus far, lower federal courts generally do not grant compensatory relief after the Supreme Court’s Mertens decision. Notwithstanding, the Court is actually split over the matter. If the Court
were to rule in accordance with the purposes ERISA was intended to
fulfill—to protect plan participants—the success of his claim would
be certain.
According to Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach, ERISA was
enacted to protect the employee plan beneficiaries, based on the idea
that the plan benefits are being held in trust, and to provide uniformity in the regulation of employee pension and welfare benefits
plans. As such, Congress based much of ERISA on common law
trust principles. But with this being a new area of law, it only provided a basic structure, with the expectation that the courts would
use trust common law to develop their own “federal common law”
for ERISA.270 On the other hand, the textualists on the Court believed that ERISA has a “comprehensive” remedial scheme that
should be applied only to protect the plan itself, not the employee
participants. From that, they inferred § 502(a)(3)’s “other appropriate equitable relief” to exclude compensatory damages.271
Although perhaps Justice Scalia had worthy intentions of controlling increased costs that may arise from allowing individual relief
under § 502(a)(3) for breaches of fiduciary duty, Congress did not
share the same sentiment. In fact, with very tenuous support for his
position, he rejected ample legislative history, case law, trust law
principles, and even express relevant text of ERISA that overwhelmingly supported the application of make-whole compensatory remedies as “appropriate equitable relief.” In fact, what Justice Scalia said
is that ERISA provides a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
270. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157–58 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I believe that, in resolving
this and other questions concerning appropriate relief under ERISA, courts should begin by
ascertaining the extent to which trust and pension law as developed by state and federal courts
provide for recovery by the beneficiary above and beyond the benefits that have been withheld;
this is the logical first step, given that Congress intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s
equitable remedies. If a requested form of additional relief is available under state trust law,
courts should next consider whether allowance of such relief would significantly conflict with
some other aspect of the ERISA scheme. In addition, courts must always bear in mind the ultimate consideration whether allowance or disallowance of particular relief would best effectuate the underlying purposes of ERISA—enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in the
administration of all aspects of pension plans and promotion of the best interests of participants
and beneficiaries.” (footnotes omitted)).
271. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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and even has exclusive jurisdiction of related claims, but his narrow
interpretation of § 502(a)(3) provides no compensatory relief to
those injured individual plaintiffs. Of course, this sort of “immunity”
encourages HMOs to deny coverage to plan participants.
The reality is that although Justice Stevens’s trust law approach is
clearly the most appropriate approach under ERISA as it now stands,
it is evidently not the best approach to HMO liability. HMOs did
not exist in their present form at the time of ERISA’s conception.
Consequently, the HMO problem simply has too many pieces than
can fit into the ERISA mold Congress has provided. Therefore,
though the Court is now caught in a tug-of-war, with very polarized
views of how to approach the problem, there is no question that
what HMO liability needs is not judicial creativity, but careful congressional consideration and action.
Charlotte Johnson∗

∗ 2nd Place Winner, 2005–2006 Louis Jackson National Student Writing Competition in Employment and Labor Law, Jackson Lewis, L.L.P. & Inst. for Law and the Workplace, Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Ill. Inst. of Tech. (March 2006), available at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/plel/LouisJacksonNWC.html.
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